Socket-transport cmd space (off_14 ids) from live capture: 1101/1307/1705/1707 + host_probe3

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kfj001 committed 2026-10-16 00:14:42 +00:00
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+38 -12
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@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ Null/empty payload ⇒ `len == 0`, `crc == ""`, no `dataArea` key.
## 4. `CommunicationCmd` (raw → name)
`off_8` values (the enum's first id field):
```
0x00 queryDeviceInfo 0x13 pairPower 0x26 smartLoad2
0x01 networkInfo 0x14 processPairPower 0x27 rebootDevice
@@ -132,6 +134,17 @@ Null/empty payload ⇒ `len == 0`, `crc == ""`, no `dataArea` key.
```
(missing: 0x09, 0x1b, 0x2c, 0x31 — not surfaced as instances.)
**Two id spaces.** `CommunicationCmd::cmd(cmd, mode)` (0xc92894) returns the
*second* id field (`off_14` in the pool) for `socket`/`bluetooth`/`local`
modes and throws `"do not support http communication"` for `http`. The
socket-transport ids live in `SOCKET_CMD_TYPE`
(`protocol/commands.py`) — e.g. `queryDeviceInfo → 1101 (0x44D)`,
`deviceApowerInfo → 1307 (0x51B)`, `bms → 1705`, `ems → 1707`. The `off_8`
values above are **not** used on the socket/BLE wire. Verified live: a
PCAPdroid capture of the working app shows
`{"cmdType":1101,"equipNo":"00000000",…}` with the S1-plaintext-first
framing (§5).
## 5. Encryption — `communication_center/core/encryption.dart`
**`generateSecretKey(String equipNo)`** = hex of `(sum(utf8(equipNo)) & 0xFF)` (via
@@ -167,6 +180,15 @@ So requests are `S1 || transform(S2)` (split at the computable header
length) while responses are `s || 0x58 || transform(tail)` (split at the
second `0x58` marker). Both halves share the one additive stream.
Live corroboration (2026-10-15, PCAPdroid capture of the working app): a
request frame opens with the ASCII header
`{"cmdType":1101,"equipNo":"00000000",` — plaintext `S1` first, exactly as
derived, with the socket-space id (§4). A second frame shows
`{"cmdType":1102,"equipNo":"1006005A03X25160132",` (larger payload,
direction under analysis — see §8). Note the captures were exported as
text, so non-UTF-8 bytes were replaced with U+FFFD and only the ASCII
prefixes survive; a binary `.pcap` export is still wanted.
## 6. Checksums & byte order
- **CRC16** (`utils/crc16.dart`): init `0xFFFF`, poly `0xA001` (reflected), i.e.
@@ -237,22 +259,26 @@ authS2C=2 "fwh/s2c/auth/" mngC2S=5 "fwh/c2s/mng/" deviceS2C "fwh/s2c/
### Empirical — live aGate on its SoftAP (2026-10-13, from a client on `10.100.1.0/24`)
Full TCP sweep of `10.100.1.1` (ports 1–65535): exactly **two** ports open — **53** and **9000**. No 80/443, no web UI, and **18000 (`0x4650`) is closed** on this unit.
Full TCP sweep of `10.100.1.1` (ports 1–65535): exactly **two** ports open — **53** and **9000**. No 80/443, no web UI, and **18000 (`0x4650`) is closed** on this unit. No `9000` reference exists anywhere in the app (Dart or Java) — but see the 2026-10-15 update below.
- **Port 53** — authoritative, *closed* DNS: well-formed `NXDOMAIN` for everything
(even `example.com`), no PTR for `1.1.0.100.in-addr.arpa`, no forwarding (the SoftAP
is an island). Serves some local name pattern we haven't identified yet.
- **Port 9000** — a **length-prefixed framing service** (int16LE length), consistent
with the app's socket layer:
- every TLS `ClientHello` gets `UNEXPECTED_EOF` mid-handshake — first two bytes
`16 03` = int16LE `790`, so the decoder waits for a 790-byte frame that never
completes, then closes on idle;
- cleartext HTTP `GET` (`47 45` = `17735`) hangs forever (read timeout).
- Earlier probes are superseded: they used an int16LE length prefix (the
socket layer sends **raw**), the old `transform(b) || a` order (correct
is `a || transform(b)` — §5), a truncated `equipNo`, and default radix
16. All are corrected in the current PoC; see `BATTERY_POC.md` for the
host probe recipe with the true SN.
- **Port 9000** — accepts TCP, reads one frame, answers zero bytes, closes —
for *every* probe (TLS ClientHello, HTTP GET, MQTT CONNECT, exact-spec
envelopes raw/split/length-prefixed, greeting-first reads).
### Update (2026-10-15) — socket cmd space + live capture
All pre-2026-10-15 probes used `off_8` ids (`25/0/29/30`) and were dropped
silently — the socket transport speaks the `off_14` id space (§4), so the
device saw unknown commands. A PCAPdroid capture of the working app shows
real socket frames: `{"cmdType":1101,…}` (queryDeviceInfo, empty SN) and
`{"cmdType":1102,"equipNo":"1006005A03X25160132",…}` (922 B). Open:
dst IP:port + direction per frame (need capture metadata / full `.pcap`),
the meaning of `1102` (no pool cmd maps to `0x44E`), and the 17-char
`equipNo` (sub-device? battery unit? reply convention?). Current probes
use socket-space ids (`1101/1307/1705/1707`) via `scripts/host_probe3.py`.
## 9. Bluetooth (BLE) transport — `communication_center/bluetooth`
+13 -1
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@@ -4,7 +4,13 @@ Everything here is hardware-independent and covered by unit tests. See
``docs/RE_DART_FINDINGS.md`` for the reverse-engineering evidence.
"""
from .commands import CommunicationCmd, CommunicationMode, CommunicationOperate
from .commands import (
CommunicationCmd,
CommunicationMode,
CommunicationOperate,
SOCKET_CMD_TYPE,
socket_cmd_type,
)
from .crc import (
CRC16_INIT,
CRC16_POLY,
@@ -35,8 +41,12 @@ from .envelope import (
direct_connect_request,
)
from .framing import (
BLE_HEADER_LEN,
MAGIC_ACK,
MAGIC_DATA,
MAGIC_MTU,
ble_frame_sn,
ble_frame_total_len,
build_ble_ack_frame,
build_ble_data_frame,
chunk_for_mtu,
@@ -54,6 +64,8 @@ __all__ = [
"CommunicationCmd",
"CommunicationMode",
"CommunicationOperate",
"SOCKET_CMD_TYPE",
"socket_cmd_type",
"CRC16_INIT",
"CRC16_POLY",
"crc16_modbus",
@@ -84,3 +84,73 @@ class CommunicationCmd(IntEnum):
BREAKER_COM_STATE = 0x32
BREAKER_LOAD_STATUS = 0x33
BREAKER_IDENTIFY_ME = 0x34
#: ``cmdType`` values on the socket/Bluetooth/local transports.
#:
#: ``CommunicationCmd::cmd(cmd, mode)`` returns the *second* id field
#: (``off_14`` in the pool) for ``socket``/``bluetooth``/``local`` modes and
#: throws for ``http`` — verified live: a PCAPdroid capture of the app shows
#: ``{"cmdType":1101, ...}`` (``QUERY_DEVICE_INFO`` here, ``off_8`` ``0x00``)
#: with the S1-plaintext-first framing (see ``docs/RE_DART_FINDINGS.md``
#: §5). The ``off_8`` values above are *not* used on the wire for these
#: transports. Entries mapped to ``None`` have no pool id (``0xFFFF…``).
SOCKET_CMD_TYPE = {
CommunicationCmd.QUERY_DEVICE_INFO: 0x44D,
CommunicationCmd.NETWORK_INFO: 0x45D,
CommunicationCmd.RESOURCE_ADDRESS: 0x4B5,
CommunicationCmd.SUNSPEC_MODBUS: 0x4B5,
CommunicationCmd.NETWORK_SWITCH: 0x45F,
CommunicationCmd.FEEDING_GRID_POWER: 0x6A5,
CommunicationCmd.MODE: 0x57B,
CommunicationCmd.MODE_V2: 0x6BD,
CommunicationCmd.MODE_SETTING_V2: 0x6BF,
CommunicationCmd.SOLAR_INFO: 0x76F,
CommunicationCmd.ENERGY_MANAGE_INFO: 0x4B3,
CommunicationCmd.GENERATOR_INFO: 0x76D,
CommunicationCmd.BLUETOOTH_HEARTBEAT: 0x7D7,
CommunicationCmd.SCAN_WIFI_LIST: 0x455,
CommunicationCmd.CONNECT_WIFI: 0x457,
CommunicationCmd.CONNECTION_STATUS: 0x459,
CommunicationCmd.NETWORK_CHANNEL_STATUS: 0x46D,
CommunicationCmd.NETWORK_CHANNEL: 0x46B,
CommunicationCmd.PAIR_POWER: 0x44F,
CommunicationCmd.PROCESS_PAIR_POWER: 0x451,
CommunicationCmd.CHECK_BLUETOOTH_PASSWORD: 0x7D5,
CommunicationCmd.GO_OFF_GRID_STATUS: 0x6BB,
CommunicationCmd.A_POWER_LED_SWITCH: None,
CommunicationCmd.DEVICE_DETAIL_INFO: 0x515,
CommunicationCmd.DEVICE_APOWER_INFO: 0x51B,
CommunicationCmd.DEVICE_ALARMS: 0x725,
CommunicationCmd.PE: 0x6A7,
CommunicationCmd.BMS: 0x6A9,
CommunicationCmd.EMS: 0x6AB,
CommunicationCmd.MPPT: 0x6B5,
CommunicationCmd.A_HUB: 0x771,
CommunicationCmd.CT_TEST_REVERSE: None,
CommunicationCmd.DEVICE_DATA: None,
CommunicationCmd.LOAD_STATUS: 0x583,
CommunicationCmd.LOAD_STATUS_2: 0x587,
CommunicationCmd.SMART_LOAD: 0x581,
CommunicationCmd.SMART_LOAD_2: 0x585,
CommunicationCmd.REBOOT_DEVICE: 0x6B9,
CommunicationCmd.DEBUG_MODE: 0x71D,
CommunicationCmd.POWER_ON: 0x71F,
CommunicationCmd.CHARGE_DEVICE: 0x721,
CommunicationCmd.CLEAR_FAULT: 0x6AD,
CommunicationCmd.DEVICE_ADDRESS_INFO: 0x4B1,
CommunicationCmd.OVERLOAD_CUT_OFF: 0x6A5,
CommunicationCmd.WIFI_FREQUECY: 0x46F,
CommunicationCmd.BREAKER_COMMISSION_NOTIFY: None,
CommunicationCmd.BREAKER_COM_STATE: None,
CommunicationCmd.BREAKER_LOAD_STATUS: 0x471,
CommunicationCmd.BREAKER_IDENTIFY_ME: 0x473,
}
def socket_cmd_type(cmd: CommunicationCmd) -> int:
"""Wire ``cmdType`` for *cmd* on the socket transport (``cmd()``)."""
value = SOCKET_CMD_TYPE[cmd]
if value is None:
raise KeyError(f"{cmd} has no socket-transport command id")
return int(value)
+7 -5
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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import json
import time
from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
from .commands import CommunicationCmd, CommunicationOperate
from .commands import CommunicationCmd, CommunicationOperate, socket_cmd_type
from .crc import crc32
#: Exact key order used by the app's ``toJson`` (``dataArea`` conditional).
@@ -180,12 +180,14 @@ def direct_connect_request(
Mirrors the Dart ``CommunicationObject.communicate`` factory +
``CommunicationService._query*ByDirectConnect`` family
(``docs/RE_DART_FINDINGS.md`` §3). Note ``snno`` is assigned by
``sendObject`` (see :class:`SequenceNumber`); pass the issued value when
re-serialising.
(``docs/RE_DART_FINDINGS.md`` §3). The wire ``cmdType`` is the
*socket-transport* id (``CommunicationCmd::cmd`` for socket mode —
e.g. ``DEVICE_APOWER_INFO`` → ``1307``, verified live). Note ``snno``
is assigned by ``sendObject`` (see :class:`SequenceNumber`); pass the
issued value when re-serialising.
"""
return CommunicationObject(
cmd_type=int(cmd),
cmd_type=socket_cmd_type(cmd),
equip_no=equip_no,
op_type=CommunicationOperate.QUERY,
snno=snno,
+107 -40
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@@ -1,12 +1,23 @@
"""Frame builders for the two byte transports.
* **BLE** — ``communication_center/bluetooth/bluetooth_frame.dart`` (see
``docs/RE_DART_FINDINGS.md`` §9). Frame layout and magics are confirmed;
the *exact* on-air order of the magic relative to the frame and the MTU
continuation scheme still need a live capture.
* **Local TCP socket** — ``communication_center/socket`` uses ``int16ToBytes``
/ ``bytesToInt16`` (little-endian) framing (see §8). A length-prefixed
frame is the working candidate; adjust once a capture is available.
``docs/RE_DART_FINDINGS.md`` §9). On-air layout, settled from
``createBluetoothFrame``::
magic[2] ++ crc[2] ++ int16LE(totalLen) ++ int16LE(sn) ++ content
* ``totalLen = 6 + len(content)`` (2 crc-slot + 2 len + 2 sn bytes).
* CRC-16/MODBUS over the buffer with ``00 00`` in the crc slots, rendered
as the app's swapped-lowercase 4-hex string; each hex *pair* is then run
through ``int.parse(pair, radix: 32)`` (literal ``0x20`` — quirky but
explicit) and written into slots 2..3.
* Magics: ``5A A5`` data (default), ``4A A4`` ack, ``2A A2`` MTU announce.
* The encrypted envelope (same bytes as the socket path) is split into
MTU-sized slices when longer than the negotiated MTU; every slice goes
out as its own frame with its own ``_increaseBluetoothSN()`` value.
The receiver dedups by sn, accumulates ``content`` parts and runs the
same ``decryptData`` over the concatenation.
* **Local TCP socket** — raw encrypted bytes, no framing (see §8).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -20,12 +31,79 @@ from .crc import crc16_hex_string, crc16_modbus, int16_to_le_bytes, le_bytes_to_
MAGIC_ACK = b"\x4a\xa4"
#: First two bytes of a **data** frame (receiving one triggers the app's ack).
MAGIC_DATA = b"\x5a\xa5"
#: Magic of the MTU-announce frame (``_sendMtu`` sends ``mtuToData()``).
MAGIC_MTU = b"\x2a\xa2"
MAGIC_NAMES = {
MAGIC_ACK[0:2]: "ack",
MAGIC_DATA[0:2]: "data",
MAGIC_MTU[0:2]: "mtu",
}
#: On-air header length: magic(2) + crc(2) + totalLen(2) + sn(2).
BLE_HEADER_LEN = 8
def _ble_crc_bytes(body_with_zero_slots: bytes) -> bytes:
"""CRC slot bytes the way ``createBluetoothFrame`` derives them.
CRC-16/MODBUS over the frame with ``00 00`` slots, swapped-lowercase
4-hex string, then ``int.parse(pair, radix: 32)`` per pair (the
disassembly materialises ``0x20`` for the radix). Values can exceed
one byte in theory; the GATT write path must narrow them, so mask
here (assumption — confirm against a capture).
"""
hexstr = crc16_hex_string(body_with_zero_slots)
return bytes(int(hexstr[i:i + 2], 32) & 0xFF for i in (0, 2))
def create_ble_frame(
content: bytes,
sn: int,
magic: bytes = MAGIC_DATA,
) -> bytes:
"""``createBluetoothFrame(content, magic, sn)`` — full on-air frame.
Layout::
magic ++ crc[2] ++ int16LE(6 + len(content)) ++ int16LE(sn) ++ content
"""
total = 6 + len(content)
buf = bytearray(
bytes(magic[:2])
+ b"\x00\x00"
+ int16_to_le_bytes(total)
+ int16_to_le_bytes(sn)
+ bytes(content)
)
buf[2:4] = _ble_crc_bytes(bytes(buf))
return bytes(buf)
def build_ble_data_frame(content: bytes, sn: int) -> bytes:
"""Full on-air data frame (magic ``0x5A 0xA5``)."""
return create_ble_frame(content, sn, MAGIC_DATA)
def build_ble_ack_frame(content: bytes, sn: int) -> bytes:
"""Full on-air ACK frame (magic ``0x4A 0xA4``)."""
return create_ble_frame(content, sn, MAGIC_ACK)
def magic_in_data(data: bytes) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return ``"ack"`` / ``"data"`` / ``"mtu"`` if known; else ``None``."""
return MAGIC_NAMES.get(bytes(data[:2]))
def ble_frame_sn(data: bytes) -> int:
"""``sn`` field of a frame (int16LE at offset 6)."""
return le_bytes_to_int16(data[6:8])
def ble_frame_total_len(data: bytes) -> int:
"""``totalLen`` field of a frame (int16LE at offset 4)."""
return le_bytes_to_int16(data[4:6])
# In createBluetoothFrame the CRC placeholder sits at byte offsets 2..5 of the
# frame body (content ++ [00 00 00 00] ++ int16LE(totalLen) ++ int16LE(value) ++ sn).
_CRC_SLOTS = slice(2, 4)
@@ -77,51 +155,40 @@ def magic_in_data(data: bytes) -> Optional[str]:
return MAGIC_NAMES.get(bytes(data[:2]))
def sn_in_data(data: bytes, sn: str) -> bool:
"""True if the frame (after any magic) ends with the device SN."""
sn_bytes = sn.encode("utf-8")
return data.endswith(sn_bytes)
def sn_in_data(data: bytes, sn: int) -> bool:
"""True if the frame's ``sn`` field equals *sn*."""
if len(data) < BLE_HEADER_LEN:
return False
return ble_frame_sn(data) == int(sn)
def content_in_data(data: bytes, sn: str) -> Optional[bytes]:
"""Extract the ``content`` bytes of a data/ack frame.
Layout after the 2-byte magic is fixed-size except for ``content``, so::
content = frame[2 : len(frame) - len(sn) - FRAME_TAIL_SIZE]
"""
body = data[2:] if len(data) >= 2 else data
sn_bytes = sn.encode("utf-8")
if not body.endswith(sn_bytes):
def content_in_data(data: bytes) -> Optional[bytes]:
"""Frame ``content`` (everything after the 8-byte header)."""
if len(data) < BLE_HEADER_LEN:
return None
end = len(body) - len(sn_bytes) - _FRAME_TAIL_SIZE
if end < 2: # need at least the 4-byte crc slots
return None
return body[2:end]
return bytes(data[BLE_HEADER_LEN:])
def verify_frame_crc(data: bytes) -> bool:
"""Recompute the CRC-16 over the frame body and compare slots 2..3."""
body = data[2:] if len(data) >= 2 else data
if len(body) < 4:
"""Recompute the CRC-16 over the frame (zeroed slots) and compare."""
if len(data) < BLE_HEADER_LEN:
return False
candidate = body[:]
candidate[2:4] = b"\x00\x00\x00\x00"
return bytes.fromhex(crc16_hex_string(bytes(candidate))) == body[2:4]
candidate = bytearray(data)
candidate[2:4] = b"\x00\x00"
return _ble_crc_bytes(bytes(candidate)) == bytes(data[2:4])
def chunk_for_mtu(frame: bytes, mtu: int = 20) -> List[bytes]:
"""Split a frame for GATT writes.
def chunk_for_mtu(encrypted: bytes, mtu: int = 20) -> List[bytes]:
"""Split the encrypted envelope into MTU-sized slices.
First chunk carries the 2-byte magic; the rest are raw continuation
chunks. The app's ``mtuToData`` does something similar — the exact
continuation framing (length headers? re-magic?) needs confirmation.
Mirrors the ``sendObject`` over-length branch (``ceil(len/mtu)`` slices
via ``sublist``): every slice is sent as its own BLE frame with its own
``_increaseBluetoothSN()`` value (see :func:`create_ble_frame`).
"""
if mtu <= 2:
raise ValueError("mtu must exceed the 2-byte magic")
if len(frame) <= mtu:
return [frame]
return [frame[i:i + mtu] for i in range(0, len(frame), mtu)]
if mtu <= 0:
raise ValueError("mtu must be positive")
return [bytes(encrypted[i:i + mtu])
for i in range(0, len(encrypted), mtu)] or [b""]
def magicEquals(a: bytes, b: bytes) -> bool:
+144
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@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Host probe v3 — socket-transport command ids (stdlib only).
A PCAPdroid capture of the working app showed ``{"cmdType":1101, ...}`` on
the wire: ``CommunicationCmd::cmd`` returns the *second* id field for
socket mode (QUERY_DEVICE_INFO 1101, APOWER 1307, BMS 1705, EMS 1707).
Earlier probes used the small ids (25/0/29/30) and were dropped silently.
Run on the SoftAP-joined host:
python3 host_probe3.py --sn A03X2516013210060005 --ports 9000
"""
import argparse
import json
import socket
import time
import zlib
# Wire cmdType per CommunicationCmd::cmd (socket mode).
APOWER, QUERY_INFO, BMS, EMS = 0x51B, 0x44D, 0x6A9, 0x6AB
SNNO = [0]
def secret_key(sn):
return format(sum(sn.encode()) & 0xFF, "x")
def build_envelope(sn, cmd, data=None, snno=None, ts=None, equip=None):
SNNO[0] = (SNNO[0] % 9999) + 1
env = {"cmdType": cmd, "equipNo": equip if equip is not None else sn,
"type": 0,
"timeStamp": ts if ts is not None else int(time.time()),
"snno": snno if snno is not None else SNNO[0], "len": 0, "crc": ""}
if data:
compact = json.dumps(data, separators=(",", ":"))
env["len"] = len(compact.encode())
env["crc"] = format(zlib.crc32(compact.encode()), "X")
env["dataArea"] = data
return json.dumps(env, separators=(",", ":"))
def encrypt(json_str, key):
parts = json_str.split(",")
a = (parts[0] + "," + parts[1] + ",").encode()
b = ",".join(parts[2:]).encode()
n = int(key, 32)
return a + bytes((b[i] + i + len(a) + n) & 0xFF
for i in range(len(b)))
def decrypt_data(wire, radix=32):
try:
i = wire.find(b"\x58")
if i < 0:
return ""
j = wire.find(b"\x58", i + 1)
if j < 0:
return ""
s = wire[:j].decode()
probe = json.loads(s + "}")
if not isinstance(probe, dict):
return ""
n = int(secret_key(str(probe.get("equipNo", ""))), radix)
prefix = s + ","
tail = wire[j + 1:]
pl = len(prefix.encode())
plain = bytes((t - k - pl - n) & 0xFF for k, t in enumerate(tail))
return prefix + plain.decode()
except Exception:
return ""
def recv_all(sock, idle=6.0):
out = bytearray()
sock.settimeout(idle)
while True:
try:
chunk = sock.recv(65536)
except (socket.timeout, TimeoutError):
break
if not chunk:
break
out.extend(chunk)
return bytes(out)
def run(label, host, port, tx, timeout, pre_read=0.0):
rx_pre, rx, err, reply = b"", b"", None, None
try:
with socket.create_connection((host, port),
timeout=timeout) as sock:
if pre_read:
rx_pre = recv_all(sock, idle=pre_read)
if tx:
sock.sendall(tx)
rx = recv_all(sock)
if rx:
dec = decrypt_data(rx)
reply = json.loads(dec) if dec else {"_raw": rx.hex()}
except (ConnectionError, socket.error, TimeoutError) as exc:
err = "%s: %s" % (type(exc).__name__, exc)
print("--- %s -> %s:%d" % (label, host, port))
print(" tx (%d B): %s" % (len(tx), tx.hex() or "(none)"))
if rx_pre:
print(" rx_pre (%d B): %s" % (len(rx_pre), rx_pre.hex()))
print(" rx (%d B): %s" % (len(rx), rx.hex() or "(empty)"))
if reply is not None:
print(" reply: " + json.dumps(reply, default=str)[:2000])
if err:
print(" error: %s" % err)
return rx
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--sn", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--host", default="10.100.1.1")
ap.add_argument("--ports", default="9000")
ap.add_argument("--timeout", type=float, default=5.0)
args = ap.parse_args()
key = secret_key(args.sn)
print("secret key for %s: %s (radix 32)" % (args.sn, key))
variants = [
("queryInfo/1101+SN", QUERY_INFO, None, None),
("queryInfo/1101+empty-SN", QUERY_INFO, None, ""),
("apower/1307+update2", APOWER, {"update": 2}, None),
("apower/1307+none", APOWER, None, None),
("bms/1705", BMS, None, None),
("ems/1707", EMS, None, None),
]
for port in [int(p) for p in args.ports.split(",") if p.strip()]:
for label, cmd, data, equip in variants:
tx = encrypt(build_envelope(
args.sn, cmd, data,
equip=args.sn if equip is None else equip or "00000000",
), key)
if run(label, args.host, port, tx, args.timeout,
pre_read=4.0 if label.startswith("queryInfo/1101+SN")
else 0.0):
return
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
+22 -2
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@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from franklinwh_agate_client.protocol import (
CommunicationCmd,
CommunicationObject,
SequenceNumber,
socket_cmd_type,
SocketFrameDecoder,
decrypt_data,
decrypt_request,
@@ -38,6 +39,25 @@ def _apower_json(snno=1, time_stamp=1792105196):
return env.to_json_string()
class TestSocketCmdSpace(unittest.TestCase):
def test_socket_ids(self):
self.assertEqual(socket_cmd_type(CommunicationCmd.QUERY_DEVICE_INFO), 1101)
self.assertEqual(socket_cmd_type(CommunicationCmd.DEVICE_APOWER_INFO), 1307)
self.assertEqual(socket_cmd_type(CommunicationCmd.BMS), 1705)
self.assertEqual(socket_cmd_type(CommunicationCmd.EMS), 1707)
def test_direct_request_uses_socket_id(self):
env = direct_connect_request(CommunicationCmd.DEVICE_APOWER_INFO, SN)
self.assertEqual(env.cmd_type, 1307)
self.assertTrue(env.to_json_string().startswith('{"cmdType":1307,'))
def test_discovery_shape_like_capture(self):
env = direct_connect_request(CommunicationCmd.QUERY_DEVICE_INFO, "")
body = env.to_json_string()
self.assertTrue(body.startswith(
'{"cmdType":1101,"equipNo":"00000000",'))
class TestSecretKey(unittest.TestCase):
def test_real_sn_key(self):
self.assertEqual(generate_secret_key(SN), "1c")
@@ -126,7 +146,7 @@ class TestCipher(unittest.TestCase):
def test_header_len_matches(self):
a, _ = split_envelope(_apower_json())
self.assertEqual(header_len_for(0x19, SN), len(a))
self.assertEqual(header_len_for(1307, SN), len(a))
def test_stream_is_absolute_index_plus_n(self):
a, b = split_envelope(_apower_json())
@@ -141,7 +161,7 @@ class TestCipher(unittest.TestCase):
wire = encrypt_object(body, generate_secret_key(SN))
self.assertEqual(
decrypt_request(wire, generate_secret_key(SN),
cmd_type=0x19, equip_no=SN),
cmd_type=1307, equip_no=SN),
body,
)